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1CHAPTER I
This paper is an investigation of some philo-
sophical facets of a legal problem. The legal problem is
that of the insanity defense, through which an acquittal
may be gained if the accused committed the criminal act
charged against him but is not responsible for that act
because of insanity. Criminal irresponsibility due to
insanity is defined differently in different jurisdic-
tions by the so-called insanity tests. Since the insanity
tests are central to the workings of the insanity defense
"the insanity defense," strictly speaking, names a variety
of procedures. However, I will use the term loosely
throughout this paper to designate the class of proce-
dures rather than any particular instance or variation
of it. The insanity defense is not merely a trial pro-
cedure, for the issue of insanity may be raised long
before trial, as early as the time of arrest, and may
continue to be an issue in the disposition of the defen-
dant until he is released from the custody of the state.
It is this entire procedure that is at issue in this
paper.
There has always been general dissatisfaction
with the particular tests and procedures employed by the
courts in criminal trials with a plea of insanity, and
although improved tests have been proffered, criticism
2has not abated. The solution to the legal problem of the
insane offender will be a procedure which is consistent
with the purposes of the system of criminal justice, and
which will accommodate fair or just treatment of the
insane offender - - a procedure only approximated by any
currently applied.
The paper is organized into three parts. Chapter
I is a presentation of the various insanity tests with
a discussion of some important philosophical and practical
difficulties with each. This discussion is intended to
convey the workings of the insanity defense, to uncover
the ethical principles underlying the tests, and to
support the claim that improving the tests will not solve
the main problems with the defense. Chapter II considers
these main difficulties. Among the major objections to
current procedure are; (i) the unacceptable and apparently
inevitable domination of expert witnesses over trials
with insanity pleas; (ii) the trauma of criminal proceed-
ings inflicted without gain on insane offenders; (iii)
the unfair practice of meting out indeterminately long
"sentences'* in mental hospitals to those who successfully
plead insanity, making the plea unattractive to those for
whom it was designed.
Chapter III is an argument for one alternative
to the insanity defense. H.L.A.Hart has argued that the
3insanity dsfsns© should bG rsplacGd by a post—tirial
insanity hearing for any convicted criminals who may be
excusable from responsibility because they are insane.
^
Hart has given good reasons for replacing the insanity
defense with another procedure, but has failed to give
reasons for preferring a post-trial hearing to a pre-
trial hearing on the insanity issue. A procedure which
allows for the possibility of a pre-trial hearing will
be argued for on the grounds that the post-trial hearing
may sometimes constitute an extravagant waste of the
court's time and an unfair imposition unnecessarily
imposed upon the defendant
.
The Insanity Tests
Each test of insanity offers some property as
sufficient for irresponsibility. The law holds that any
defendant who has done a criminal act but who has the
property set out in the test for the jurisdiction is not
responsible for that act. The law also holds that a
person who is not responsible for a crime should not be
punished for the crime. Thus, underlying each insanity
test is an ethical principle: A person having the property
named in the test should not be punished for his breach
of the law. Of course, "should" here might be given a
1. H.L.A.Hart, Punishment and Responsibility , (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), Ch.VII.
4legal non-ethical reading, as in "Cars should not be
parked on the north side of Chestnut Street on the first
day of each month," However, the insanity test seems to
embody a strong ethical intuition which most of us
presumably share, that it is morally wrong to punish a
person who only broke the law because he was insane.^
Assuming, then, that the tests imply cetain ethical
principles, one of the fundamental philosophical problems
surrounding the insanity defense is to discover the
relative merits of the principles underlying the various
tests
.
The M*Naghten Test ; , . .to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.
The fundamental question raised by the ethical
principle excusing insane offenders is: Why should an
insane person be excused from responsibility? The answer
implicit in M'Naghten is that insane persons ^ not know
what they are doing or else that what they are doing is
wrong. Part of the strength of this account is that the
insane person not only does not know, but also, in some
sense he cannot know the nature of his acts. At least the
2. For objections to the principle, see Thomas Szasz, LaWi
Liberty and Psychiatry (New York: Collier, 1963).
5ignorance of an insane person is not of a reckless nature.
Ordinarily, outside the law, **I did not know I was doing
that,” or "I did not know that that was wrong," counts
as a good excuse unless there is some presumption that I
should have known, in which case my ignorance is my own
fault and so is no excuse. The insane generally fall un-
der no such presumption, and so their lack of knowledge
seems a reasonable excuse
,
The M'Naghten rule suffers from two important
conceptual obscurities. One of these is that it is unclear
what "know" means in the test. The major controversy over
the M'Naghten test has been between those who claim that
"know" should be read narrowly to involve only cognitive
or intellectual awareness, and those who claim that
"know" should be more broadly construed to involve emotion-
al as well as intellectual appreciation of the act, its
consequences, and its overall context. Those who argue
for the broad construal of "know" point out that knowing
what one is doing ordinarily involves motivation, and
not merely behaving insanely and without motive. Since
knowing what one is doing, in this sense, is a necessary
condition for mens rea, the broad construal seems prefer-
able. While it is none too clear what the distinction
is between the broad and narrow readings of "know," it
is nevertheless very clear that some such distinction
can be made, and since the M’Naghten test itself leaves
6it unclear which interpretation is correct, it is
dangerously ambiguous.
The second difficulty with M’Naghten concerns
the meaning of the word "wrong". The major battle here
has raged over whether "wrong" means legally or morally
wrong. The test itself offers no clue as to which sort
of wrongdoing determines guilt, and there are difficulties
with either interpretation.
If we interpret "wrong" as "against the law"
then ignorance of the law is defense for breaking it
for the insane. This might seem reasonable since the
insane not only may fail to know the law, but may fail
'
to be capable of it, so that they may not be accountable
for their ignorance. Also, one reason ignorance does
not ordinarily excuse is that the practice of admitting
such a defense would greatly diminish the deterent effect
of criminal sanctions. It is widely agreed, however, that
the loss of deference resulting from the practice of
excusing the insane is negligible, and the particular
rationale for allowing the excuse is of no consequence.
However, the principle underlying this rationale
seems incorrect. The underlying principle seems to be
that all and only those unable to know the law are
irresponsible. This seems at the same time too broad
and too narrow. It is too narrow because there are quite
obviously irresponsible persons who are quite capable of
7learning the law but who are unable to use what they know
to guide their behavior. The most obvious example is
compulsive behavior - - the kleptomaniac knows he steals,
he simply cannot refrain from it. On the other hand,
the reading of M'Naghten seems too broad because there
are no doubt persons who are so are so morally debauched
that although they are unable to know the law due to
some impairment, even if they could know the law, they
would not hesitate to disobey it
.
On the other hand, mere moral wrongness will
not do either as the interpretation of "wrong" in
M'Naghten. By this interpretation, the M'Naghten test •
impies that an offender is innocent even if he knew his
act to be against the law, so long as he was unable to
understand the immorality of his act because of his
impairment. If this were the case, the law could not
successfully impose sanctions against acts that are
morally permissible, since no one could know such acts
to be immoral . The underlying principle might be read
slightly differently to avoid this criticism by stipu-
lating that the inability to know the immorality of the
illegal act is not because of the logical impossibility
of knowing it to be immoral, but because of mental impair-
ment. However, even if the principle could be seated so
as to avoid obvious counter-examples, the principle would
still be unclear because there is no indication as to
8whether "wrong" means "against one's own standards" or
"against community standards." One's own standards may
be so peculiar that inability to Know that one's act
is against one's own moral standards may be irrelevant
for legal purposes; and community standards are quite
nebulous so that it may well be impossible to determine
if an act violates those standards.
In his book, The Insanity Defense
, Abraham
Goldstein argues that these difficulties over interpreta-
tions of the key words in M'Naghten are irrelevant in
practice. As to the problem about what "know" means,
Goldstein claims that the real difficulty here is that
•
the narrow interpretation would make the insanity defense
impossibly difficult for the defendant, and, he points
out, no court imposes the narrow reading, while many do
explicitly opt for the broad one. As to difficulties with
the meaning of "wrong" the insanity defense is almost
exclusively exercised in cases in which the crime charged
is "sufficiently serious as to make society's moral
judgement identical with the legal standard."''
The claim that the obscurities of meaning in
M'Naghten have no practical import ignores the problems
such obscurities impose on the defense, and to a lesser
extent on the jury as well. For the defense, the vagueness
3. Abraham Goldstein, The Insanity Defense (New Haven;
Yale Univ. Press, 1967), p. 52.
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of the test makes it impossible to determine exactly what
needs proving for exculpation. Should the defense try to
prove that the defendant did not understand that his act
was illegal, or that it was immoral? And if the defense
focuses on the moral construal of the test, should it
take the moral standards of the community or of the
defendant? And what are to count as the moral standards
of the community? One effect of leaving these questions
unanswered is that the defense must prove too much: it
must answer all of these questions to be sure to satisfy
the jury that the defendant is innocent.
Without guidance beyond what is in the test,
juries will almost inevitably have to take up these
questions themselves. Surely it is not a good test that
leaves the jury to ponder complicated issues of philosophy,
jurisprudence, and psychiatry.
It is important that in the insanity defense,
ordinarily the defense and not the prosecution bears the
burden of proof. It is the job of the defense to prove
that the defendant meets the requirements of the test.
Thus the vagueness of the test further and unfairly
burdens the defense.
Finally, the M’Naghten test has been widely
criticised for failure to accommodate the cases of
defendants whose mental abnormalities impair behavior
10
ratliGr tfean cognitivG and Giriotional facultiGs.
It sGGms VGry rGasonablG to say of CGrtain offondGrs that
thGy know and approciatG thG naturG of thoir offGnsGs,
but arG unablG to control thoir bGhavior, so that thoir
offGnsGs arG committGd unwillfully and yGt knowingly.
ThG klGptomaniac stGals knowing that ho is stGaling, and
pGrhaps GVGn wishing that he wGrG not stGaling. A major
inadGquacy of M'NaghtGn is that it impliGs that an
offGndGr who know thG wrongnGss of his act should be
punished even if he could not control his act. On the
grounds that such a person ought not be punished, many
jurisdictions have added the so-called "irresistable
impulse" test to M'Naghten.
The Irresistable Impulse Test ; A defendant is relieved
from responsibility if at the time of the act he suffered
from a mental disease such that he could not have con-
trolled his conduct.
The irresistable impulse test is misnamed in
that the test does not confine itself to acts which are
of a sudden or impulsive nature, as the word "impulse"
implies. On the contrary, the lack of control may be
longstanding. The test, then, implies that an insane
offender should be excused from responsibility because
he cannot control his actions. We shall henceforth call
this test the control test .
The control test is quite obviously insufficient
since those who can control their behavior may neverthe—
11
less be unable to know or appreciate their significance.
Such people fit the M’Naghten test, and so the two are
very often used together.
A person who does an act but who is unable to
P^^vent himself from doing the; act, or from doing some
other act causally sufficient for that act, is not
morally responsible for the act. Loosely speaking, such
an act is not the product of the agent’s will, but is the
product of something else. When the kleptomaniac steals,
one might say that it is not the kleptomaniac
,
but the
kleptomania which causes the theft to happen. Thus the
control test raises the issue of the relation between
the illegal act and the disease. This relation is known
as the product relation , or more simply, productivity ,
and the problem of productivity is also introduced in
the ALI and the Durham test
.
The ALT Test ; A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of
his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of the law.
The Durham Test : ... an accused is not criminally respon-
sible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect.
Judge Bazelon has argued, I believe correctly,
that the ALI test conceals a productivity requirement
because it allows for no workable alternative to conclu-
sory testimony on this issue from experts. Under ALI,
12
the impairment which results from the disease must be
of the kind that could produce the criminal act if the
defendant is to be acquitted. Thus the majority opinion
in Brawner, which adopted ALI
,
points out that the "men-
tal disease of a kleptomaniac does not entail as a 'result'
a lack of capacity to conform to the law prohibiting rape."^
Under ALI
,
once the defendant has been determined to have
had some mental abnormality, the central question becomes:
"Was the impairment which resialted from this disease of
the sort that could produce or cause the criminal act?"
This is, in essence, the question of productivity.
The Control, the Durham, and the ALI test, then,
include the productivity requirement; that is, the
criminal act must have been the product of mental
disorder if the defendant is to be acquitted. The pro-
•ductivity requirement seems to arise from the reasonable
supposition that an insane person can commit a crime
and be held responsible if the insanity is not related
to the crime. Surely the kleptomaniac is not excused from
responsibility for wanton murder because of his mental
abnormality. And so the productivity requirement seems
reasonable enough.
4.United States v. Brawner 471 F. 2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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N0VGirthGlBss
, ©inbodiGd in th© productivity
r©quir©m©nt is a naiv© und©rstanding of th© r©lation
b©tw©©n mind and body, or b©tw©©n th© actions and mind
of a person. Whil© it is quit© clear that it would b©
to say that a sever© case of kleptomania caused
a person to commit wanton and profitless murder, it is
not at all clear that it would be correct to say that
the same case of kleptomania caused the person to steal.
Consider the following problem of analysis. What does it
mean to say:
(1) The act A at time t was the product of a mental
disease or defect M.
As an example, consider the following entry under
”dypsomania"in Black’s Law Dictionary :
Dipsomania : An irresistable impulse to indulge in
in intoxication, either alcohol or other drugs - -
opiums. This mania, or dipsomania, is classed as one
of the minor forms of insanity. Repeated intoxication
for a number of years, which is entirely voluntary
is not dipsomania. One having the power to refrain
from the use of intoxicants, and who becomes intoxi-
cated voluntarily, is not affected with dipsomania.
Other mental disorders involving compulsion are similarly
defined. Kleptomania consists "in an irresistable pro-
pensity to steal;" homocidal mania "manifests itself
in an irresistable inclination or impulse to commit
homocide." The mania-type disorders seem the most likely
to fit the productivity requirement since other types
of disorders have more disparate and less easily identi-
fiable symptoms.
14
As a specific problem of analysis, then, let us consider:
(2) John I s taking a drink at time t was the product
of his dipsomania.
John's dipsomania consists in an "irresistable impulse"
which is not really an impulse at all, and should be
understood as a disposition to drink which may be
momentary and episodic or chronic. The disposition is
of the nature of a compulsion, so that other dispositions
John may have at t and which may be in conflict with his
disposition to drink will be, in some sense, inoperative
at t
.
The type of thing which is said to "produce"
John's act of taking a drink is a disposition. Naively
it seems clear enough that an impulse or a disposition
in a person to do some act can produce that act
,
so
long as certain other conditions obtain; eg. that the
act is one that it is possible for the person to do. It
might also seem clear enough that the stronger an impulse
or disposition is, the more likely it is that it will
produce the act
.
There are two main difficulties with this naive
understanding. One is that it is for from clear what a
disposition is. Secondly, given some understanding of
what a disposition is, what does it mean to say of such
a thing that it produced or caused a certain act? The
first problem, then, is to give an analysis of:
15
(3) John's disposition, D, caused him to do an act of
type A at a time t.
We might analyze "S has a disposition, at t,
to do an act A" as a subjunctive conditional. Under cer-
tain conditions, C, S would drink if he had dipsomania
but would not if he did not. If we could describe C, we
could analyze "S has dipsomania at t” as "S is such that
if any of C obtained at t, then S would drink at t."
The analysis this approach will yield will
not be an analysis of (3), since, strictly speaking,
it will be an analysis of
:
(3a) John's having a disposition, D, caused him to
do an act
,
A
,
at t
.
This will pose no important difficulties, although John's
having a disease may well "produce" certain acts which
the disease itself does not produce. Kleptomania does
not cause sufferers from it to seek therapy, yet having
kleptomania might. For the most part, the influence John's
disposition has on his behavior will be the same as the
influence hi.s having the disposition will have.
The subjunctive conditional analysis of (3a) is:
(3b) John's being such that if any of the conditions
C held at any time, t, then John would do an act
of type A caused John to do an act A at t'
.
There are several problems with the subjunctive
conditional analysis of a disposition like dipsomania.
One of these is that, for a variety of reasons, the
16
description of the relevant conditions, C, needed to
complete the analysis is unavailable. One reason is that
science has discovered only so much about mental dis-
orders. Presumably some of the conditions underlying
mental disorders are organic, and these are not yet known
any of the abnormalities likely to give rise to
criminal behavior. A second reason is that a full listing
of ^11 the conditions under which a given dipsomaniac
would drink but under which he would not drink if he
were not a dipsomaniac would simply be too long to
enumerate. In any case, the sort of complicated organic
disorder which might be part of the conditions we are
looking for would be of little help to a jury trying to
determine if the disorder caused the accused to commit
a crime
.
A second problem with the subjunctive condi-
tional analysis is that the conditions, C, will not only
include what we might call the "extraordinary" conditions
underlying the disorder, but also the "ordinary" conditions
which must obtain if a person is to do a particular act.
C, for example, will include that S is alive and well
enough to do A, if the subjunctive is to be true. Thus
to say that S * s doing A at t was the product of a
disease D is really to say that D, together with many
other disparate conditions joined together into some
complex causal chain leading up to S * s doing A at t
.
17
If this is what "produce" means here, then the defense
must prove that such a causal chain existed, and this
is an unrealistic burden for the defense to bear.
A third problem with the subjunctive condition-
al analysis of dispositions is that it may not be clear
enough for our purposes. We are looking for clarifica-
tion of what it means to say that a certain disposition
caused an act. To say, to this end, that the agent's
being such that some subjunctive conditional is true of
him caused the act is not greatly clarifying because
the meaning of disposition terms or sentences is not
significantly more mysterious than the nature of subjunc-
tive conditionals.
Finally, some have complained that the product-
ivity requirement — independent of any particular analysis
of it — may compel the jury to speculate unjustifiably.
Judge Bazelon, in his dissenting opinion in Brawner , held
that
:
the productivity requirement tends to focus the
attention of expert witnesses and the jury on
extraneous issues, and to divert them from the
core of the question of responsibility. Durham
suggested that the government could establish
criminal responsibility either by proving free-
dom from illness or by proving that the illness
did not cause the act . And one way to prove that
the illness did not cause the act is to prove that
the defendant would have done it anyway. C arter
even more explicitly than Durham invited the gov-
ernment to establish responsibility by proving
that the defendant would have committed the act
even if he had not been ill. Carter stated that
18
productivity amounted to causation of the "but for"
variety; an act is the product of mental diseaseif accused "would not have committed the acthe did commit if he had not been diseased as he
was." This approach invited experts and juries to
speculate about the defendant's character, and
convict him on the ground that he would have been
"bad" if he had not been sick.^
Moreover, given our subjunctive conditional analysis, the
jury will also be forced to speculate about whe^-her or
not the conditions which obtained were in fact C -condi-
tions. Since in many cases not even the experts will
know the answer, the jury’s speculation on this matter
may be unjustified and wild.
The concept of productivity seems to resist
clear and simple analysis; what seemed to be a fairly
simple notion is only deceivingly so. The productivity
tests are, for this reason, deceivingly simple in their
application by the jury. Not only is the notion of pro-
ductivity unclear, but its analysis in (3b) raises some
difficult technical problems, about which conditions are
C-conditions . The conditions, C, will include details
about the defendant's mental and physiological state.
These elements of C may be beyond the jury’s compre-
hension. Furthermore, in case of conflicting expert
testimony on these matters, the jury will be unable to
evaluate the relative merits of the competing claims.
Finally, the jury members will be unable to decide for
themselves whether any condition an expert claims is a
5. United States v. Brawner 471 F. 2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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C-condition is in fact a condition that would correctly
complete the analysis.
One test which is not employed in any juris-
diction, but which is nevertheless a promising alterna-
tive to those in current use is the test proposed by
Judge Bazelon in Brawner .
The Bazelon Test ; . . ,a defendant is not responsible if
at the time of his unlawful conduct his mental or emo-
tional processes or behavior controls were impaired to
such an extent that he cannot justly be held reponsible
for his act.
In his dissenting opinion in that case, Bazelon
argued that the ALI and Durham tests, which alone combine
the knowledge and control requirements, are nevertheless
unsatisfactory because they tend to focus the entire
trial onto the testimony of experts, and because the
productivity requirement focuses both the experts' and
the jurors* attention on inappropriate issues rather
than on the main issue of responsibility.
The problem of expert domination of insanity
trials will be discussed at some length later on, but
there are, in essence, two such problems. One is that
the testimony of expert psychiatric witnesses as to the
mental state of the defendant is usually incomprehensible
to the jury. The other problem relates to the first; it
is that the technical and esoteric testimony proffered
by psychiatric witnesses disguises underlying moral
20
judgements by these witnesses as to the responsibility
of the defendant. The moral responsibility of the defen-
^^rit is generally considered to be a matter outside the
expertise of the witnesses, and yet the jury is often
subjected to highly prejudicial and inappropriate
testimony simply because the inappropriateness is well
concealed.
In order to circumvent these difficulties,
Bazelon argues, the test should not try to define respon-
sibility in terms of productivity or in any other terms,
but should instead leave the problem of judging respon-
sibility entirely up to the jury.
The Bazelon test, then, answers the question,
"Why should an insane offender be excused from responsi-
bility?” with the simplest possible answer; "Because the
insane offender is not justly held responsible."
Rather than offering criteria of responsibility the
Bazelon test merely guides the jury in such a way as to
make the issue of responsibility primary in their con-
siderations .
The Bazelon test is arguably the test most
likely to achieve its purpose. While it fails to define
responsibility for the jury, it does focus the jury’s
attention on that fundamental issue. The justification
for this test, particularly its failure to define
.responsibility, is that the jury, as a surrogate for
21
tliG pGoplG
,
brings with it to trial thG currGnt conununity
standards. SincG community standards changG, tGsts which
dGfinG responsibility may tend to fix that concept
unjustifiably. The M’Naghten test, for example, came
to be viewed as too narrow because it was unadaptable
to the evolving modern model of human psychology.
In spite of its apparent advantages, there are
several important points against the Bazelon test. One
of these is that the test itself, by virtue of its
failure to define insanity, leaves the law so vague as
to raise serious doubt about its constitutionality.
Were a jurisdiction to employ only the Bazelon test,
the jury members would have only their various senses
of justice to go on, since the test defines nothing for
them and makes an explicit appeal only to each juror's
sense of justice. Since senses of justice vary widely
from juror to juror, if no further guide is provided
them, their verdicts will be reached on very different
grounds. Thus, under the Bazelon test, the law lacks a
certain desirable rigidity, and perhaps constitutionality,
since it is unconstitutional to convict a man where the
standards of illegality are vague and ill-defined. The
Bazelon test fails to define the standard of responsibility
and so might be unconstitutional in application.
It might be argued that the Bazelon test could
22
be employed as the insanity test without this attendant
vaguness by coupling the test with jury instructions
that would clarify the test. One possibility here is to
require the judge to mention in his charge to the jury
some of the other tests that have been thought to specify
the conditions which excuse defendants from criminal
responsibility. This would provide the jury with further
guidance, not provided by the Bazelon test, without
imposing any of these other tests on the jury. One of the
problems with the other tests is that, as putative defi-
nitions of insanity, they tend to straight jacket the
jury by limiting the considerations that are relevant
under them. Employing the Bazelon test while mentioning
some or all of the others would guide the jury's consider-
ations without restricting them unduely.
Even so employed, the Bazelon test would not
escape all of the problems with the other tests. For
example, if much of the testimony of the experts focused
upon the defendant’s state of knowledge when the crime
was committed, the best guide the jury would have would
be the M'Naghten test. The obscurities about what "know"
and "wrong" mean in that test would again pose problems
for the jury. Similarly, the productivity tests would
be just as unclear under Bazelon as on their own. That
the law does not require the jury to use M’Naghten or
the product tests is of little help if it is forced to
23
use one of these by the lack of any better guide.
Thus, if Bazelon is employed by itself, it does
not sufficiently define the concept of irresponsibility,
and if it is used in conjunction with the other tests,
the jury is still encumbered by the main obscurities of
those other tests.
24
CHAPTER II
The problems with the insanity defense run
deeper and wider than mere philosophical obscurities in
the tests. The procedure abuses the insane offender by
forcing him needlessly through traumatic criminal pro-
cedings, and thereby also wasting the time of the courts.
as it fails to lead to just results. Presumably, the
just result of a procedure like the insanity defense
would be that insane offenders are exculpated. Yet
insane offenders are regularly punished in our system
because the consequences of raising the defense are so
odious as to discourage its use and because those who do
procedure, the insanity defense needlessly creates
communication problems of major proportions since it
brings together medical experts, legal experts, and
jurors presumably lacking in medical and legal expertise,
in a rigid and formalistic framework.
with the insanity defense into two groups: (1) problems
of evidence or communication, and (2) problems of
fairness. The first group is centered around reaching
the verdict. The jury, and not the group of experts, is
rss a procedure, the insanity defense is unjust insofar
raise it may be punished upon courtroom
We may somewhat arbitrarily sort the problems
25
charged with reaching a verdict, and the difficulties
involved in conveying the right information to the jury
in comprehensible form pose the hazard that the jury
will, in effect, abdicate its responsibility to the
experts. The second group of problems concern the defen-
dant and the inability of the procedure to make a dispo-
sition on his case in a fair manner. To an extent, the
second group overlaps with the first since a fair
verdict will depend on the accuracy of the information
conveyed to the jury.
Group 1 : Some Problems About Evidence
There are two main problems about evidence in
fl
an insanity trial. One is that expert testimony is not
understood by the jury; and even if the testimony itself
is comprehended, the underlying scientific bases for
such testimony are not understood. Thus|^ither the
testimony or the scientific bases for it fail to reach
the jurors for their scrutiny and analysi^ The second
problem is that the testimony is conclusory as to the
ultimate legal-moral issue of responsibility, and this
is of course aggravated by the fact that these conclu-
sions as well as the bases for them are obscured by the
6. Rules of evidence in some jurisdictions restrict the
admission of evidence about the defendant’s mental state
if it does not bear directly on insanity as defined in the
test. This raises a third evidentiary problem, but which
is no longer widespread enough to merit discussion here.
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technical jargon in which they are framed.
Expert testimony on insanity differs according
the nature of the trial. In some cases, this testi-
mony provides the jury with a consistent and coherent
analysis of the defendant's psychological history and
make-up. More often, however, the prosecution and defense
witnesses disagree. When this happens, each side is
forced to back up its claims with supporting evidence,
and this naturally leads to a battle among experts over
esoterica
.
f^o testimony of this sort can contribute to
a fair verdict, and the defendant is the most likely to
be harmed in such a battle of experts. As the claims in
support of his defense become more esoteric, they become
more susceptible to derogation by the prosecute^ The
defense has set about proving that the defendant was in-
sane at some remote past time. If a battle erupts the
defense will present the sorts of scientific evidence
quite familiar to psychologists and psychiatrists, but
alien to jurors; eg., Rorschach tests. frhe prosecution
will reply in kind> however the prosecution also has
availible the tactic of casting aspersions on the
abstract and tenuous nature of the debate. By appealing
to the ignorance of the jury, the prosecutor may foil
the defense attempts to prove what it set out to prove
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While there are limits to permissible conduct
in court, the prosecutor can clearly make such an appeal
and influence the verdict. In Brawner, the court, meeting
en banc
, refused to reverse Bravmer's conviction in
spite of the following remarks by the prosecutor;
Now, another one, you remember, on the same test,
that drawing test
,
the doctor said he had Len of
those little things and they hadsquiggles and lines
and angles, and he was asked to draw those, ten of
them separately. And the doctor said he rotated,
he rotated one. And I said, well, what was the
significance of that. Well the significance of that
is that shows there is organic brain damage... That
is a hard indicator, that is a hard indicator of
organic brain damage... It is your function to
take that evidence and decide whether what that
doctor said as far as you are concerned made any .
sense at all.^
(This last remark was especially pernicious since even
prosecution witnesses agreed that Brawner had organic
brain damage)
.
The labels attached to the disorder by the
various witnesses gives some indication of the jury's
problem in evaluating expert testimony; "psychologic
brain syndrome associated with convulsive disorder,"
"personality disorder, disorder associated with epilepsy,"
"explosive personality, or epileptic personality disorder,"
"explosive personality with epileptoid personality
disorder."®
7. United States v. Brawner , op. cit. p. 1003, ftnt . 77.
8 Ibid, p. 1014.
iThe jury simply cannot weigh conflicting
evidence of the sort proffered by psychiatric experts.
The real import of such testimony is lost in the tech-
nical jaugon, and what reaches the jury and affects
their verdict are the less admirable aspects of the
battle — the rhetoric and sophistry, as well as the
conclusory judgements about the defendant's guilt or
innocenc^
In light of the very unsatisfactory relation
between the experts and the jury, efforts have been
made to improve the tests in the hope that so doing
will improve the presentation of expert testimony.
Recently, the main efforts in this direction have been
focused on the productivity requirement. It has been
realized through courtroom experience that tests
framed in terms of a "product" relation between the
act and the disorder of the defendant inevitably lead
experts to testify about the moral and legal respon-
sibility of the defendant.
f'
The reason for this is quite simple. There
are, loosely speaking, but two contenders for the
responsibility for the crime: the disorder and the
defendant. Under the product tests, the psychiatric
witness will naturally be called on to testify as to
whether the crime was, or could have been, the product
of the defendant's disorder. If it was the product of
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th© disorder, then the defendant is not responsible;
and if not, then by elimination, the defendant is
responsible. Thus testimony about the productivity issue
is, by simple logic, testimony about the legal-moral
responsibility of the defendant.
Bazelon argues that some other test, the test
we have been calling the Bazelon test, is preferable
to the product tests because it makes clear that the
ultimate issue is that of responsibility, and this
makes it easier to spot conclusory and inappropriate
testimony. Furthermore, tests couched explicitly in
terms of "productivity" draw the jury's attention
away from their primary concern to such issues as
the proper analysis of terms like "product," "cause,"
and "the decisive difference between doing and not
doing the act." What these terms mean is not at issue;
at issue is only whether or not the defendant is
responsible
.
Even critics of the productivity requirement
agree that for exculpation, some meaningful relation
must hold between the mental disorder and the criminal
act of the defendant, and that the relationship must be
causal in nature. Thus Bazelon admits:
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Durham did not invent the question of causalityEvery responsibility test demands some linkbetween the defendant
’
s
_
act and his impairment;
Durham merely gave explicit recognition to theissue
. Thus the critical question is not whether
the act must be related to the impairment
. .
.
but rather how directly, if at all, the jury’s
attention should be focused on the question.^
Since exculpation demands some productive
or causal link, there is no way of avoiding this issue,
and Bazelon’s suggestion that the jury should net focus
on this question "directly, if at all" is misconceived.
First of all, as already pointed out, the questions of
responsibility and productivity are, and are quite
obviously, functionally and logically equivalent for
the purposes of the jury once the existence of a mental
impairment has been established. The simple truth is
that the defendant is irresponsible and only if
(i) he was mentally sick at the time of the act, and
(ii) his sickness caused ("produced," "resulted in," etc.)
the crime. This is so obvious that the jury cannot
possibly avoid consideration of the second condition
of irresponsibility; nor can the prosecution or defense
do their jobs without investigating that issue through
the examination of witnesses.
Secondly, Bazelon wants to avoid expert
testimony, couched as it is in scientific and seemingly
certain terms, directed at the issue of the defendant’s
9. United States v. Brawner, op. cit. p. 1022.
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responsibility. What Bazelon fails to see is that no
test or definition, however vague, can help but focus the
remarks of expert witnesses on just that issue.
To see that this is so, consider the ALI test:
A person is not responsible... (if) as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.
Under this test, it will be a routine matter for psychia-
tric witnesses to testify directly as to the capacities
of the defendant at the time of the crime. In fact, the
Washington decision, as subsequently revised in Brawner,
requires that the following guidelines be read to
psychiatric witnesses;
As an expert witness, you may, if you wish and if
you feel you can, give your opinion whether at the
time of his conduct the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect, and whether, ^ a result ,
defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law
.
(Emphasis
added)
The psychiatric witness, while forbidden from
testifying about the responsibility or blameworthiness
of the defendant, is invited to testify that the defendant
has or lacks those characteristics which the court
explicitly holds sufficient for exculpation. By stipu-
lation, embodied in the ALI test, one who lacks certain
capacities thereby lacks responsibility. To invite
witnesses to make judgements as to the defendant's
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relevant capacities to invite judgements about his
criminal responsibility.
Not only do experts make judgements which
immediately imply others about responsibility, but the
latter judgements are concealed as such from the jury.
The jury will not hear any expert testimony directly
about the defendant's responsibility because the court
recognizes the jury might be unduely influenced. However,
the jury is influenced by testimony about the capacities
of the defendant which implies facts about his responsi-
bility. This leaves the jury in no better position
than if the witnesses were more direct, since, in the
end, the jury is not left to decide on responsibility,
but rather only to make a simple logical calculation; in
fact the jury is worse off since matters are so obscured
by the indirectness of the testimony.
Any test of insanity, which defines insane
criminal irresponsibility, is in effect a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for criminal irrespon-
sibility due to insanity. The focus of the expert testimony
will, of necessity, be on the conditions of irresponsi-
bility given in the test. To ask an expert to take the
stand and then to forbid testimony about the defendant's
capacities, his ability to control his behavior, and so
on, would be senseless since these are the major issues
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with which the psychiatrist may be of some help.
It is clear enough that Bazelon's test is not
a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for irrespon-
sibility due to insanity. However, the issues will not go
away with the adoption of a new test, and the expert
who testifies, under Bazelon's test or any other, that
the defendant could (not) control his behavior is testi-
fyingabout the defendant's responsibility — a fact that
surely will not escape the jury. The fact is that no
test, however clever, can conceal the fact that the
psychiatrist is testifying about the central legal-moral
issue.
The reason why psychiatric witnesses cannot
avoid testifying about the ultimate issue is that, -with
a plea of insanity, the defendant's mental state is the
central issue; it is virtually the same issue as that of
the defendant's responsibility. In such a trial, facts
about the defendant's psychology are determinative of
legal-moral decisions. for instance, the defendant
suffered from a mental disorder at the time of the
committing of the crime, such that he could not be
expected to be able to control his behavior (or to know
what he was doing, etc.), then the defendant is innocent;
he should not be held responsible. The hypothesis is
psychological, and expresses just the sort of facts we
would expect to hear from psychiatric witnesses. These
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psychological facts are not separate from the legal-
moral issue, but are rather determinative of the appro-
priate legal-moral outcome.
It is true that in certain cases the jury
will have to reach a verdict independently of the psych-
iatric evidence. This will be the case when this evidence
is inconsistent due to conflicting testimony, or else
insufficient because the relevant psychological state of
the defendant cannot be discovered by the experts. In
such cases the jury must weigh what facts it has to reach
a verdict, and it is arguable that this is generally
what the jury must do, since there is usually conflicting
testimony.
However, the fact that there may be insufficient
psychological evidence to determine the verdict does not
imply that psychiatric witnesses are not testifying about
the ultimate issue; it only shows, what is obvious
anyway, that there may not be enough straightforward
information about the defendant's mental state to reach
a verdict on the basis of that information alone. This is
not a desirable situation because it leaves the jury to
make a determination on very subjective grounds, or on
their best guesses.
The courts have never recognized that the
issues of the defendant's mental state and his responsi-
bility are as interdependent as they are. Instead they
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insist that the experts should confine their testimony
within their domain and not encroach on that of the
jury —
— as if there is some sharp boundary between these
domains. The irony of this is that the tests themselves
define criminal irresponsibility due to insanity in terms
of a mental disorder and/or the relation between a mental
disorder and an act. Mental abnormality and its relation
to behavior is much of the subject matter of psychology
and psychiatry. The bare minimum condition for being
responsible or punishable for some act is that one did
the act consciously and intentionally — and the law
reflects this fact in the doctrine of mens rea . The
concerns of psychology on the one hand, and the law on
the other are simply not so distinct as Bazelon, and the
courts in general would seem to believe
.
The upshot of these considerations about evi-
dence at a trial with a plea of insanity is this: The
insanity defense is unworkable because it is at the
same time unacceptable and inevitable that experts will
dominate such a proceeding. The experts' domination over
the proceeding is inevitable because the psychiatric
witnesses are alone in possession of the information
most relevant to the jury's verdict; it is unacceptable
because the jury cannot understand and evaluate the
expert testimony. Perhaps the experts themselves should
make the final decision, and this possibility will be
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considered in Chapter III . Although experts would clearly
"dominate" the proceeding if they were in the position
both to provide the hearing with crucial testimony and
to make the final decision, the obvious advantage would
be that the testimony would be understood by those who
reached the verdict.
Of course, many trials, in many areas of the
law introduce expert testimony before juries. Antitrust
suits, for example, may become deeply involved in
technical economics. Thus the problem of expert domination
is not unique to the insanity defense. Some experts, like
ballistics experts, are generally state witnesses whose •
testimony is not contradicted by any defense expert
witness. Trials which involve this sort of expert
testimony do not encounter many of the problems surrounding
the expert testimony at trials with an insanity plea,
since many of these result from the jury’s inability
to weigh the merits of conflicting testimony. While
it is not by any means the purpose of this paper to call
the jury system into question, it may well be that there
is a general problem with jury trials in cases where
there is conflicting expert testimony which is not well
understood by the jury. And it may be that the merits of
the jury system are outweighed in these trials, and that
the defendant should have the right to choose some other
kind of trial.
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Group 2; Some Problems About Fairness
A procedure may be unfair in either of two
ways. It may be such that it yields unjust solutions to
problems or conflicts to which it is applied, or it
may be such that its very application constitutes an
injustice. Trial by ordeal exemplifies both ways in
which a procedure may be unfair. On the one hand, it
is an unlikely way of determining guilt, so that the
results of applying the procedure are likely to be unjust.
On the other hand, forcing an innocent man through an
ordeal to determine his innocence imposes harm where
none is deserved and thus the procedure victimizes
the innocent by its very application.
The insanity defense is also unfair in both
of these ways. As already noted, the problematical
insanity tests render the application of the procedure
unsatisfactory for reaching a just verdict. More seriously,
the procedure yields unjust results by omission. [sy
failing to cope fairly with insane offenders, the pro-
cedure forces those who are able to raise the defense
successfully to raise other defenses or to plead guilty.
The result is that irresponsible and therefore innocent
people are too often punished in our systemjThe
procedure is also unfair in its application because it
may traumatize those who are irresponsible by the ordeal
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of a criminal trial and investigation. Of course, a
criminal trial may be an ordeal for any defendant, and
not only for the insan^ However
,
I will argue that the
ordeal the trial represents to the insane is unfair
ecause it is, in their cases, avoidable by substituting
another procedure for the insanity defense, and because
the ordeal may well be catastrophic for the insane.
The specific workings of the insanity defense
shed some light on these problems about fairness, and
so it will be worthwhile to consider in detail how the
procedure is employed. In particular, two aspects of the
procedure are of interest; the allocation of the burden
of proof at trial, and the disposition of the defendant
upon acquittal
.
The Burden of Proof
an increasing number of jurisdictions,
already more than half in the United States, the
burden of proof is with the defense with a plea of
insanity The significance of the burden of proof is
that whichever side bears it will lose if the jury is
not persuaded either way by evidence presented at trial.
This is an important issue in trials with the insanity
plea sincej^e nature of psychiatric evidence is such
that the jury is very likily to be left with some doubt^
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The burden of proof is more of less onerous
depending upon the weight of evidence required for proof.
The proof may be required to persuade beyond a reasonable
doubt, or, less stringently, by a preponderance of
• Ordinarily in a criminal trial the prosecution
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty as charged. The "preponderance of evidence"
is the usual civil standard of proof. The reasonable
doubt standard, regardless of which side bears it, has
been considered by many to be too heavy a burden with
a plea of insanity on the grounds that it is simply too
easy to create a reasonable doubt. Thus whichever side
is relieved of the burden has too easy a job under this
standard.
Two intermediate possibilities exist between
those assigning the full criminal standard burden to
the defense or the prosecution by allowing either to
bear the less rigorous civil burden. The possibility of
assigning the prosecution the burden under this standard
has been pretty much ignored, largely due to a widespread
belief that the insanity defense is already too easy.
There are two main arguments for assigning the
burden to the accused. The first is that [^e law presumes
all men to be sane, and thus the defense based on insanity
is an affirmative defense, which must prove the facts to
be contrary to the presumptiorj This reasoning is intended
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to be in parity with that which allocates the burden of
proof in ordinary criminal proceedings to the prosecution
on the grounds that all men are presumed innocent. The
underlying principle is that whichever side controverts
the legal presumption bears the b-urden of proof.
This principle, however, leads the system into
a contradiction, ^hat the defendant bears the burden of
proof of irresponsibility contradicts the principle that
he is presumed to be innocent. The presumption of innocence ’
requires, by law, that a defendant be acquitted unless
guilt is established by sufficient evidence. The presump-
tion is therefore binding on the jury in its deliberation^
If the defense fails to prove innocence and the state
fails to prove guilt or criminality, the law demands
'acquittal for the defendant. The presumption of sanity
requires that the jury consider the defendant sane
unless insanity is proved. Since legal guilt requires, or
implies sanity, and since sanity, plus the absence of
another excuse, plus commission of the act collectively
imply guilt, once the commission and the absence of
other excuses are established, guilt is logically
equivalent to sanity for the jury. Thus a presumption
of sanity may be, in some cases, a presumtion of guilt,
contradicting the presumption of innocence.
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The second argument for shifting the burden
of proof to the accused is thatfThe prosecution will
virtually never be able to dispell all reasonable doubts
about the defendant's responsibility. The evidence laid
out by the prosecution cannot reasonably be expected
to refute completely that of the defens^ The jury will,
in many cases, fai: to understand s>ibstantial portions
of the psychiatric testimony, and what is successfully
understood is often vague or contradictory to other
pieces of testimony. fPhus the defense will be too
easy if the burden of proof rests with the state^^
It is remarkable that this argument has had
as much success as it has. It is very bad reasoning, and
favors the prosecution in an undisguised sort of way.
That the argument goes to show is simply that the usual
criminal standard of proof is too rigorous in cases
with insanity pleas. It clearly does not follow from the
fact that the burden of proof under this standard is
too heavy that the defense and not the prosecution should
bear it, even by some lesser standard.
10. President’s Commission on Crime in the District of
Columbia Report 550 (1966).
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Th© issu© of thG allocation of th© burd©n of
proof is still uns©ttl©d, and th© Supr©m© Court has
rul©d that it is not a constitutional issu©.^^
Disposition on Acquittal
Wh©r© a pl©a of insanity has b©©n ©nt©r©d,
most jurisdictions r©quir© a special verdict if th©
jury acquits. A simple verdict of "not guilty" is not
often acceptable and is nowhere acceptable when other
defenses have been raised in addition to insanity. In
some states the jury may find the defendant irresponsible
but no longer insane, but this is rare. In most juris- •
dictions a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity"
must be entered on acquittal, without any finding as
to the present state of the defendant's mind at verdict.
[in one third of the jurisdictions, the defen-
dant's mental condition at the time of his disposition
will not be considered. In these states the defendant is
automatically committed to a hospital if acquittec^ The
automatic hospitalization is ordered by the judge and in
a very few states the "hospital" may in fact be a jail,
12
a prison, or the custody of the sheriff.
11 . Leiand v. Oregon , 343 U.S. 790, 798-799 (1952).
12. Henry Weihofen, Mental Disorder and the Criminal
Defense
,
p. 372.
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In those states in which hospitalization is
not mandatory, it is discretionary and usually conditioned
on a finding that the defendant presents a threat to
himself or to others. The decision to commit may come at
the verdict or after a post trial hearing on that issue.
The commitment, if ordered, is always indefinitely long,
until release is gained by proof of the defendant’s
having recovered sanity, unless commitment is for life.
In Massachusetts, for instance, a person acquitted by
reason of insanity for murder or manslaughter is auto-
131— ....
matically committed for life. Jin many jurisdictions
proof of regained sanity will not be sufficient for
release unless there is also proof that there is no
substantial danger of a relaps^
The widely held presumption is that one who
has been judged to have been insane at the time of the
committing of the crime is still insane at the time of the
verdict. In one third of the states, where commitment on
acquittal is mandatory, the presumption is not even
open to dispute. Furthemore, in jurisdictions in which
commitment is at the court's discretion, it is generally
permissible for the judge to order hospitalization on
the basis of a presumption of continued insanity and
danger to the community.
13. Brakel & Rock, eds.. The Mentally Disabled and the Law
(Chicago: U, of Chicago Press, 1961), Table 11.1, p. 434.
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In some jurisdictions judicial decisions have
found such fault with the mandatory commitment provisions
of the insanity defense that such commitment is never
ordered. Thus in the District of Columbia, for instance,
in the case of Bolton v. Harris
. (395 F. 2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968)), the Court of Appeals found mandatory commitment,
as well as the presumption of continued insanity, unwar-
ranted and reactionary in the face of the supposedly
liberal Durham rule. Thus in some jurisdictions the
acquitted defendant will be committed only if the judge
finds, upon special hearing, that the defendant should
not be free
.
The current disposition practice of indeter-
minate commitment of acquitted defendants seems to be
justified as follows; Curing an insane offender takes
an unpredictable amount of time. To release an uncured
offender poses a serious risk of permitting another offense
since the condition that precipitated the first offense,
insanity, has not been removed. On the other hand, to
confine an offender after he has been cured serves no
purpose, and imposes unnecessary unhappiness on the
defendant. Thus commitment for a longer period or a
shorter period than required for cure is not as desirable
as commitment for the indeterminate period required for
cure
.
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The argument justifies only individual acts of
committing an acquitted irresponsible offender indeter-
^iriately
,
but it does not justify the practice. While
^ct of committing an insane offender indeterminately
may have the effect of keeping that offender confined
for all and only the time during which he is dangerous
or uncured, the practice has the effects of allowing the
insane to be wrongly imprisoned and of releasing them
from prison uncured. frhe defense, after all, seeks
the strategy which will, among other things, minimize
the defendant's confinement, and the practice of
indeterminate commitment renders the insanity defense
an unattractive strategy The result of the practice,
then, is that many who could successfully raise the
defense, and who are perhaps dangerously insane, follow
some other strategy such as plea bargaining, pleading
diminished responsibility, and the like. The result of
this is that the defendant who is insane ends up in
prison rather than in a hospital, so that upon release
he has wrongfully suffered punishment and has received
no hint of any sort of therapy for his disease. As one
premise of the argument for indeterminate commitment
implies, to release an insane offender before he has
received therapy is risky and wrong.
The practice of committing irresponsible
offenders for a period comparable to the sentence for the
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crime charged would result in the release of fewer, and
not more uncured offenders than the practice of indeter-
minate commitment. The practice of determinate commitment
would reduce the incentive for insane offenders to go to
prison instead of a hospital. This would tend to increase
the number of the insane who got some therapy before
release. Those who go to hospitals under such a practice
are released no sooner than they would be from prison.
Furthermore, commitment for a period comparable to the
sentence for the crime charged is substantial even if it
is not altogether sufficient for cure, since charges
against which one is likely to raise the insanity defense
are generally severe. Thus determinate commitment would
not mean short or insubstantial commitment.
The Trauma of Criminal Trial
The insanity defense is a procedure designed
to cover two main issues at trial: the determination of
criminal guilt, just as in any other criminal trial
procedure, and the consideration of the defendant's
special excuse of insanity or irresponsibility. The
nature of the excuse offered is such that it should be
permitted consideration on its own merits before pro-
ceding with the criminal trial.
We may begin to see that this is so by
considering a situation which is in a certain way analo-
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gous to that in which the insanity plea is raised.
Suppose that a child upsets and breaks a lamp, but
claims that he did not mean to do it, he just began to
feel dizzy or sick and fell against the lamp. Unless
grounds for suspecting the excuse arise, the adult will
no doubt consider the excuse and its implications first
before pressing the child to determine his degree of
guilt. If the excuse fails to convince, then the adult
might begin to consider issues of mens rea (and malinger-
ingl )
.
When a crime has been committed, and a plea
of insanity entered, the defendant is subjected to the
usual treatment of a person charged with a criminal
act, except that the insanity pleader will not likely
be released on bail and so will probably spend the duration
of the trial in jail or in a hospital. At trial, the
prosecutor may parade witnesses before the court whose
testimony is designed to show that the defendant is
bad and not sick; that he should be treated with retri-
bution for his deed and not with pity. Also, the pro-
secutor may attempt to draw the focus of the court away
from the excuse, or to cast aspersions on the excuse
itself, or, as in the Brawner case, on the evidence
supporting the excuse. Furthermore, while most defendants
enjoy a presumption that they are innocent, even if they
have confessed, the insanity pleader is usually, by
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virtue of bearing the burden of proof, presumed to be
guilty. All these features of a criminal trial may
bring serious pressures upon those who are already sick.
The characteristic in common between the
child in the above example and the insanity pleader is
that the excuses offered, if true, have consequences
which may require attention and not just exculpation;
and an uninhibited investigation of guilt may be in
conflict with the needs implied by the excuse. Thus the
child may be in need of medical attention, and post-
poning or delaying that for the purposes of proving guilt
seems unjust. Similarly, the excuse offered by the insanity
pleader is such that an investigation of criminality may
well aggravate the condition which counts as his excuse.
This will not add any strength to the excuse itself,
but this relation between excuse and trial may in some
cases give good reason to postpone the criminal trial
until the excusing condition has been considered.
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CHAPTER III
We have several independent moral standards
by which we may judge the relative merits of the insanity
defense and any alternative procedure for exculpating
irresponsible offenders.
(1) The procedure should be likely to have a high
success rate of actually exculpating those who
are irresponsible.
(2) The procedure should be likely to exculpate only
insane irresponsible offenders.
(3) The procedure should not inflict harm where none
is deserved.
(4) The procedure should be constitutional.
These four standards seem to be intuitively
sound. While there is no way to provide any proof of
their soundness in the absence of a moral theory, there
are independent reasons for accepting them. (1) is
implied by the principle that insanity may count as a
valid excuse and that insane irresponsibility should
exculpate. (2) and (3) are inconsistent with utilitarianism,
which might mitigate against them. However, the implication
that guilt is neither necessary nor sufficient grounds
for punishment has been the source of a good deal of
embarrassment to that theory, and I take it that the
very strong intuitions that most of us have that the
guilty should be punished and not the innocent are the
ultimate source of this embarrassment. Thus (1) - (3)
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are at least on a strong intuitive ground. There are
clearly counter-examples to (3), however I am taking
none of (1) - (4) as absolute standards. It seems right
to say that of two procedures, the one which inflicts
the least amount of undeserved harm is, at least for
that reason, to be preferred. (4) is also not to be
taken as absolute, since it may well be that the best
solution would require a constitutional amendment.
However, of two otherwise equally preferred procedures,
if one is constitutional while the other is not, the
constitutional procedure will be preferable. This will
be so both because the constitutional procedure will
more certainly be consistent with the rest of the system
of criminal justice, and because it will be more likely
to be implemented.
Some Desirable Features
The four standards are suggestive of certain
features which would be desirable in any procedure to
serve as an alternative to the insanity defense. In
combination these features describe the skeleton of
an alternative procedure which will measure up to the
/
standards better than the insanity defense does. I
will now consider some alterations which seem promising
in light of their adaptability to meeting the standards.
51
If procGdurG is to havG a high succgss
ratG of Gxculpating all and only thosG who arG irrGspon-
siblG, it must bG dGsignod to maximizG thG chancGs of
discovGring who is and who is not rGsponsiblG. To
enhancG thG chancGs of dGtGrmining rGsponsibility
corrGctly
,
thG following fGaturGs should bG incorporatGd
:
(a) ^ must bG clGar what nGGds to bG GstablishGd . ThG
tGsts individually havG sGrvGd to blurr this mattGr, but
in thG aggrGgatG, thGy havG providGd us with a variGty
of VGry plausiblG sufficiGnt conditions for irrGsponsibility
.
—ThG accusGd did not know what hG was doing.
—ThG accusGd did not undGrstand thG contGxt of his act
or its most obvious consGquGncGs including possible
punishment; or else was substantially unable to appreciate
any of these things even though in some restricted sense
he knew them.
— The accused was unable to control his behavior.
—The accused was so sick or disabled as to be unable to
have a motive or mens rea .
These conditions have all been accepted by
the courts at some point, and those that have been
rejected have been so mainly because they are, by them-
selves, incomplete.
This list or one similar to it could be used
to focus the inquiry. The main drawback to the use of a
list of sufficient conditions for irresponsibility is
that it makes establishing responsibility more difficult
than it should be. To ease this difficulty one or two
of the conditions could be chosen early in the hearing
as the most applicable in the particular case. Once the
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most plausibly applicable condition is isolated, esta-
blishing responsibility should only require establishing
that this condition did not hold.
The list of conditions could be much longer
and more clearly spelled out than the one above, and
could be made adaptable to changing views in psychiatry
by providing that the list may be added to.
(b) The best available evidence about the defendant * s
responsibility should be had by the body that makes the
determination . As I have argued above, the issues of
responsibility and insanity are inseparable when the
defense of insanity is raised. The deciding body should
have the most accurate description available of the
defendant’s mental state, and this suggests that the
deciding body should not be a jury of laymen. Since the
ultimate isues with the defense of insanity are legal
and psychiatric, the body making the determination should
be made up of persons with expertise in one of these
areas. The most relevant information to the determination
is simply not accessible to a jury of laymen. Constitu-
tionally based objections to this proposal will be con-
sidered below.
(c) In order to maximize the chances of exculpating a 13^
and only the irresponsible , the procedure which applied
with a plea of insanity should not be such that those w^
are in fact irresponsible will not even raise ^ defen^
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because of the harsh consequences of doinq so . The only
way to open the defense is to impose an upper limit on
the duration of allowable involuntary commitments. How
to determine these upper limits is an enormous problem,
and one which I will not confront. However, one very
reaonable step in the right direction is to require
that maximum involuntary commitment may not exceed the
maximum sentence for the crime with which the defendant
is charged. The important change to make in the current
procedure is to impose whatever upper limit is necessary
to open the defense up to those who are irresponsible.
As long as the precedure imposes unreasonably long
involuntary commitments upon those who are acquitted,
it cannot possibly have a very high probability of
exculpating the irresponsible.
There are two main objections that might be
raised here. The first is that whatever is done to make
the defense of insanity more attractive to those who are
innocent will also make it more so for those who are
guilty. (No aspect of our criminal system seems to
arouse more fears about letting the guilty go fi^ee than
the insanity defense.) Surely there are upper limits
I
which would attract the guilty to the defense. However,
by allowing psychiatrists to make the decisions
rather
than a jury, the precision of the findings will be
enhanced, thus lessening the chances of sham
insanity
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pleas being successful for the guilty. Also, if the
commitment and sentence are similar in length, it is
neither dangerous to the community nor advantageous to
the defendant to have him committed and confined in a
hospital, rather than in a prison.
The second objection is that the upper limit
would inevitably allow some insane persons, who are still
dangerous, to be released into the community; what should
be relevant for release is that the patient is not
dangerous, and not that some arbitrary time limit has
run up. To this objection are two responses. One is
that the law provides for civilly committing persons
who are dangerous and so, if the patient is still clearly
dangerous at the end of the commitment period, he may
be committed civilly. Secondly, any person who is so
sick that hospitalization for a period as long as the
sentence for a serious crime cannot render him non-dan-
gerous should not be discouraged from raising the insanity
defense. To discourage such a person is to force him
into the penal system, and he is not very likely to
be harmless after his sentence is up.
In certain cases, the criminal trial may
unjustifiably inflict harm on innocent irresponsible
defendants. It is desirable to allow for the consider-
ation of the defense of insanity before the criminal
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to allow the defendant to avoid having
unnecessary harm inflicted upon him.
On the other hand, in certain cases the
defense of insanity can only be made strong by testimony
on the part of the defendant or other witnesses which
may tejnd to incriminate the defendant. To require that
the defense be considered before criminal trial would
probably violate the Fifth Amendment, especially if the
evidence presented at the hearing could be admitted or
used against the defendant at trial. A procedure which
forced the defendant to reveal facts which could be of
use to the prosecutor or else to forego his strongest
defense would also violate standard (1) by in effect
closing the defense to such defendants; raising the
defense would then increase the likelihood of conviction.
Thus the procedure most likely to satisfy
standards (1) and (4) will be one which allows the def-
endant to choose when he will raise the defense for
consideration in a separate hearing. By incorporating
this flexibility into the procedure, the infliction of
undeserved harm may be minimized. At present, most
jurisdictions permit the court and the prosecutor to raise
the defense for the defense. As long as raising the
defense does not also raise the risk of indeterminate
commitment, allowing the court or the prosecutor to
raise the defense will not jeopardize the defendant.
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In light of the above
-reconunended alterations
to the insanity defense, we may outline a special
alternative procedure by which the defense of insanity
may be raised. The special procedure, which we will call
"the insanity defense*" will not replace the current
procedure, the insanity defense, but will be available
as an alternative to it. The insanity defense* should
incorporate the folowing features:
( i) The insanity defense* should permit the defendant
to present his case to a panel of experts rather than
to a jury of laymen .
The exact makeup of the panel may be a matter
of jurisdictional preference, but there should be at
least one member of the bar for the jurisdiction and
at least one licensed psychiatrist. Also present at
the insanity defense* should be the defendant and
counsel. It may also be advisable to have the prosecutor
present, although this will present special evidentiary
problems if a criminal trial results from the findings
of the hearing, since evidence presented at the hearing
should not be admissible at trial. The special hearing
should have the power to subpoena witnesses.
The adversary process is probably not the
most adequate for determining responsibility. The delicate
issues involved in discovering with pricision the state
of the defendant's mind may require an approach similar
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to that taken by mental hospitals, where decisions of a
similar nature, and often with similar legal implications,
are made regularly. Members of the legal profession on
the panel, as well as the prosecutor if present, should
be entrusted with ensuring that the appropriate legal
issues are considered, and not simply the interest
of the defendant
.
( ii ) The concept of criminal irresponsibility due to
insanity should be clearly and, if necessary, extensively
defined by law for the panel .
To employ a vague and thereby flexible standard
of insane irresponsibility is to introduce, at every
trial or hearing in which the defense is raised, an
ex post facto law. To convict a person on the basis of
a vague or inclear test therefore violates due process.
While much has been made of the insadequacies
of the insanity defense tests, many of these deficiencies
bear specifically upon the communication between expert
witnesses and juries. Thus, for the purposes of the
insanity defense* some extensive compilation of these
tests may be adequate, even if such would not be adequate
for the purposes of a jury trial.
(iii) **Burden of proof,” such as it is in a special
hearing of this nature, should rest with the state.
To impose this burden upon the state is not
to require of it that it prove responsibility, since the
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hearing should probably not be an adversary proceeding.
The force of the burden of proof here is only that the
panel should find the defendant irresponsible in the
absence of sufficient evidence either way.
(iv) The panel should find the defendant- "irresponsible
(innocent) of the crime charged against him*' or else
**of sound mind and responsible for his actions at the
time of the commission of the crime. ”
There should also be some provision for the
possibility that the panel is unable to make any finding,
as for instance when the members cannot reach any
consensus
.
(v) If the defendant is found irresponsible, he is
acguitted of the crime witn which he is charged .
If the state believes the acquitted defendant
to be insane and dangerous, civil commitment procedings
should be held before the defendant's release. Otherwise,
or if commitment is found unwarranted, the defendant
should be released.
Since civil commitment of an acquitted defendant
is the indirect result of his having raised the insanity
defense*, there should be some limits set for the maximum
permissible involuntary commitment of an acquitted
defendant. Without this provision, the insanity defense*
will simply be closed to most defendants in virtue of the
possibility, or probability, of too harsh an outcome.
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Indeterminate commitment, as well as commitment for
longer than criminal sentences do not have the supposed
effect of detaining dangerously insane persons; instead
this practice has the effect of forcing the dangerously
insane to raise defenses other than insanity, whereby
they are often inappropriately shunted into the criminal
penal system, and upon release they have received no
therapy. Even if upper limits allow for the release of
dangerously insane persons, their absence has exactly
the same effect, only worse since the release is from
prisons instead of from hospitals.
( vi ) If the defendant is found responsible for his actions
at the time of the crime, he should go to trial if he has
not already been tried and convicted .
. If the defendant has already been convicted
before the insanity defense* hearing, his conviction
stands if that hearing finds him responsible. If he has
not yet been tried, he should go to trial. In this case,
the only diversion from the ordinary criminal procedure
should be that the judge instructs the jury as follows:
A special hearing has been conducted to consider the
issue of the defendant's mental state on
(date and tim^ of the crime). The defendant has been
found to have been of sound mind at that time, and
responsible for any acts he committed. No finding
was made or considered as to whether or not the
defendant did the act with which he is charged.
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A inotion for a spGcial hGarinq to consid0 r thG
issue of insanity may be made and may be granted at any
tiine during the criininal procedure after arrest and
before completion of sentence (if defendant is found
guilty)
.
The motion for such a hearing should be
granted at the discretion of the judge, and may be made
by the defense, the prosecutor, or the judge. The motion
should be granted if the judge finds reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant was not responsible when
the crime was committed.
The insanity defense* may therefore raise the
issue of insanity at any time during trial. However, to
avoid unnecessary or intentional discontinuity of the
trial, any motion for a special hearing made during the
trial must be supported by good reason why the hearing
should be held interrupting the trial rather than before
or after the trial.
(viii) The insanity defense, in its present form, may be
raised at trial .
To deny a defendant the right to raise the
insanity defense before a jury at trial has been ruled
unconstitutional in Louisiana, and is probably in
violation of the United States Constitution as well.
In 1928 Louisiana instituted a procedure for considering
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the insanity issue separately before a "lunacy commission"
which was empowered to commit if the defendant was found
insane or to send him to trial if he was found sane. At
trial, however, the defendant was not permitted to
raise the insanity defense, and for this reason the
statute providing for this procedure was found to
violate due process and the right to a jury trial.
If the defendant is granted a pre-trial
hearing on the issue of insanity and is found to be
sane, he may still wish to raise the insanity defense at
trial. This will raise some serious problems about evidence
presented at the insanity defense* hearing. I will not
attempt to resolve these because the rules of evidence
in the various jurisdictions are quite complicated
and would certainly have implications about what would
and would not be permissible.
14. State V. Lange , 168, La. 958, 123 So. 639 (1929).
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Conclusion
The procedure under which insanity is considered
as a legal excuse for criminal behavior needs revision.
The courts, recognizing this, have recently devoted some
effort to the task of improving the insanity tests; and
with some success. However, there are still problems with
the tests, and there are also identifiable problems with
the insanity defense which are not resolvable by simply
changing the wording of the tests. Rewording the tests
will not serve the critical function of diverting the
insane from the penal system, nor will it improve the jury's
comprehension of expert testimony.
The insanity defense*, which has been outlined
above, offers one solution to these problems. At the
same time, the insanity defense* offers some promise of
mitigating some of the lesser evils of the defense. The
insanity defense*, for example, would avoid the occasional
injustice of forcing a truely sick defendant to defend
himself in a criminal trial. The flexibility of the
timing of the special hearing seems the best way of
avoiding harmful and unnecessary prosecution of the
innocent insane
.
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